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This paper extends the standard quality ladder model of innovation and quality growth by
allowing for heterogeneous industries. This enables us not only to deal with the
Schumpeterian hypothesis about market power and innovation, but also to analyze industry
specific demand pull and technology push effects. In accordance with the empirical evidence,
we show that perspective of large market power, favorable technological opportunities and
high demand expectations as well as the economy-wide endowment with qualified labor,
unambiguously spur innovative activity.
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21. Introduction
Since the early nineties, endogenous growth theory, as developed by Romer (1986), Lucas
(1988) and Barro (1990), was substantially enriched by the so-called Schumpeterian growth
models which decisively build on stochastic innovation processes as the engine of market
evolution and growth. In contrast to the former models, the quality ladder approach not only
explains innovation and growth by intentional R&D activities of private firms, but also
formalizes Schumpeter’s (1942) vision of a continuing process of creative destruction due to
old products becoming obsolescent when new products with higher qualities appear. Aghion,
Howitt (1992) were among the first to develop the theory of repeated quality improvements
by incorporating an endless sequence of successive patent races, as introduced by Loury
(1979) and Lee/Wilde (1980) in Industrial Organization theory, into a dynamic general
equilibrium model of innovation-based growth. In this model, technological progress results
from a stochastic process of vertical product improvements along a given ‘quality ladder’.
Since there is only one economy-wide quality ladder, all goods’ sectors are synchronized and
can thus be treated like a single industry. For this reason, the model is appropriate when
analyzing stochastic growth and cycles on the macro level, but it is not suitable to account for
industry specific effects of market power, demand expectations or technological opportunities
in the multitude of existing industries. This shortcoming would not be more than a justified
simplification if the basic conditions in different industries were similar. There is, however,
overwhelming empirical evidence in the Industrial Organization literature that the innovative
behavior of firms varies in a fundamental degree across industries and that basic industry
conditions such as demand, opportunity and appropriability measures explain more than the
half of the inter-industry variance (see, e.g. Cohen et al. 1987). Thus, a crucial condition for a
descriptive model of innovation-based structural change and growth is a more disaggregated
structure of industry sectors.
The multi-sectoral model of Grossman/Helpman (1991a,b), which will be called the standard
quality ladder model in the following, fulfills this condition.1 In contrast to the Aghion/Howitt
(1992) model, it is characterized by a continuum of industry sectors and, hence, a continuum
of quality ladders. This generalization of the sectoral structure is, however, not motivated by
the desire to introduce heterogeneous industries, but rather to generate a smooth and
deterministic time path of economic growth which is comparable to the corresponding
dynamics of the predecessor models of endogenous growth. In fact, as Stokey (1995) has
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 Valuable extensions of the standard quality ladder model are provided e.g. by Segerstrom/Anant/Dinopoulos
(1990), Segerstrom (1991), Jones (1995), Stokey (1995), Davidson/Segerstrom (1998) and Cheng/Tao
(1999).
3already noted, this kind of generality is rather illusory, since the sectors operate completely
independently and the aggregated R&D behavior is again exactly that of a one-sector
economy. In addition, the distribution of consumer expenditures as well as firms’ R&D
activities turn out to be uniform across industries. These implications are again in sharp
contrast to the empirical findings.
The present paper therefore aims to extend the standard quality ladder model by allowing for
sectoral heterogeneity and to derive some testable results about the determinants of innovative
activities at the industry level. According to the neo-Schumpeterian hypotheses, as
summarized e.g. in Kamien/Schwartz (1982), Cohen/Levin (1989) and Cohen (1995), the set
of determinants should include at least market power effects, demand pull effects and
technology push effects. The standard model includes expected market power and
technological opportunities as essential determinants of the innovation process but – as noted
above – only within a symmetric treatment of all industries. Demand pull effects are
completely neglected. The extended model presented in this paper captures industry
heterogeneity and is therefore able to describe the evolution of the structure of an economy as
the result of industry specific innovation processes which themselves depend on some basic
industry characteristics of the supply and demand side. Furthermore, even in this generalized
quality ladder model, an explicit aggregation over industries can be performed and, therefore,
the macroeconomic development can be analyzed consistently and in line with the alternative
fundamental models of endogenous growth (see, e.g. the systematic treatment in Barro/Sala-i-
Martin 1995 and Aghion/Howitt 1998).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the structure and the dynamic time path
of consumers’ expenditures in the sectoral disaggregated economy and introduces the source
of demand asymmetry across industries. Section 3 deals with the pricing behavior of
incumbent firms and derives inter-industry differences in the firms’ expected market power.
Section 4 presents the disaggregated patent race approach which accounts for industry
specific technological opportunities. Section 5 solves the model and identifies the
determinants of R&D activities on the industry level as well as the determinants of
macroeconomic growth. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Structure and Dynamics of Consumers’ Spending Behavior
In the household sector, we assume that consumers share identical preferences according to
the time separable discounted utility function
4(1) U C e C t dtt( ) ln ( )= −∞ ρ
0
with a unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution where ρ is the common rate of time
preference and






represents the flow of instantaneous utility where q(j) denotes the quantity and s(j) the partial
utility elasticities of consumer goods in each industry j. As in the standard model, we assume
that there is a continuum of consumer goods indexed by j∈[0,1]. However, we extend the
model by removing the restriction s(j)=1 ∀ j, i.e., we allow for an asymmetric demand
structure in the economy in order to analyze demand pull effects below.
Each product can potentially be produced in a countable-infinite number of qualities. The
quality grades of the goods are arrayed along the rungs of an industry-specific quality ladder.
Each new generation of the goods in industry j provides a λ(j) times higher quality, where the
λ(j)>1 are assumed to be exogenous and fixed over time but may differ between industries,
while the standard model imposes the restriction λ(j)=λ ∀ j. The quality improvements result
from successful innovative activities undertaken in a separate R&D sector to be characterized
below. If the lowest quality available at time t=0 is normalized to one, the highest available
quality of good j is given by )j(m)j(λ , where m(j) = 0,1,2,... denotes the number of sequential
quality improvements in industry j up to the present. At each moment in time, the highest
quality levels in all industries define the technological state-of-the-art.
Each household is endowed with one unit of labor and maximizes discounted utility subject to
its dynamic budget constraint
(3)
 
A rA w E= + − ,
where A denotes the value of asset holdings, r is the certain return on consumers’ portfolio, w
is the wage rate for labor, and
E p j q j dj= ( ) ( )
0
1
represents the flow of spending where p(j) is the price of product j. As usual, the
maximization problem is solved in two stages. In the second stage, consumers maximize
5instantaneous utility at time t subject to a given level of expenditures E. This yields the static
industry demand functions
(4) q j s j E p j( ) ( ) / ( )= .
Substituting these demand functions into (1) and (2), the consumers’ first-stage maximization
problem is solved by choosing the dynamic time path of E(t) subject to (3). Solving this
intertemporal optimization problem yields the well-known Keynes-Ramsey rule
(5) 

/E E r= − ρ .
Because of the homothetic preferences, (5) applies not only to each representative consumer,
but also to the aggregate economy when E denotes aggregated spending.
3. Limit Pricing of Incumbent Firms
On the production side, the economy is endowed with the single input factor labor. In all
industries, one unit of labor is needed to manufacture one unit of the consumer good,
regardless of quality. Thus, an industry leader whose technology is assumed to be perfectly
protected by an infinitely lived patent, will set a price sufficiently below the monopoly price
so that the closest follower cannot compete without realizing negative profit flows. It is
shown in the standard model that industry leaders undertake no research targeted to improve
the quality of their own products because the incremental gain of a two-step quality advantage
to an incumbent is strictly smaller than the gain of a one-step quality advantage to an external
innovator. This result also holds in our extended version of the model. Therefore, in each
industry the optimal limit-pricing strategy is given by
p j j w( ) ( )= λ
where the magnitude of quality improvements λ(j) obviously serves as an indicator of the
market power of the incumbent firm in industry j. Thus, each industry leader can realize a
corresponding profit stream
(6) pi λ( ) ( / ( )) ( )j j s j E= −1 1
6which depends on the aggregated spending of consumers as well as on the basic industry
conditions on the supply and demand side. As will be shown below, industry profit flows do
not have to be equal in a dynamic equilibrium with R&D engagement in all industries, if
incumbent firms face different risks of displacement by an entrant with a higher quality
product. In the general equilibrium, derived below, the expected discounted value of a firm in
the research sector is zero, independent of the industry to which the R&D efforts are targeted.
This implies that the innovation and hence obsolescence rates in industries with higher profit
flows will be exactly compensated for either by a shorter time period of realizing this flow or
by higher expected costs of R&D. The resulting inter-industry differences in the speed of the
quality upgrading process are responsible for the asymmetric evolution of the economy’s
market structure.
4. R&D Competition of Potential Entrants
The quality of consumer goods can be upgraded by a sequence of innovations, each of which
builds upon its predecessors. To produce a higher quality consumer good, a blueprint is
needed. These blueprints have to be developed by innovative firms in a separate R&D sector.
The lure of monopoly rents drives potential entrants to engage in risky R&D projects to
search for the blueprint of a higher quality production. The first firm to develop the new
design is granted an infinitely-lived patent for the intellectual property rights. This is why the
competition takes the form of a patent race between rival firms. The prize for an innovation is
the monopoly profit flow (6) that will last until the next success is achieved in the same
industry. There is free entry into each patent race for the next quality improvement. Each
potential entrepreneur may target his research efforts at any of the continuum of state-of-the-
art products, i.e. it may engage in any industry. If it undertakes R&D at intensity h(j) for a
time interval of length dt, it will succeed in taking the next step up the quality ladder for the
targeted product with probability h(j)dt. This implies that the number of innovations in each
industry follows a memoryless Poisson process with the industry specific arrival rate h(j).
The technology discovered with any innovation opens up the opportunity for all R&D firms to
search for the next innovation. This implies an external spillover effect of technological
knowledge since even laggard firms can equally participate in each patent race without having
taken all of the rungs of the quality ladder themselves. It is only the patent protection which
guarantees temporary appropriability of innovation rents. The innovation production function
is approximated by a linear specification where one unit of R&D intensity, h(j), requires µ(j)
units of labor Lh(j) per unit of time. Thus, the number of realized innovations in each industry
j follows a Poisson process whose arrival rate is given by
7(7) h j L j jh( ) ( ) / ( )= µ ,
where )j(Lh  is the labor input in the research sector devoted to a quality improvement in
industry j, and µ(j)-1 denotes the labor productivity of R&D and will be used as an indicator
for the technological opportunities in industry j.2 In the standard model, µ(j)=µ ∀ j is
required, i.e. the R&D projects in all industries are assumed to be equally difficult and there
are no inter-industry differences in the technological opportunities. At a flow R&D cost of
wL j dth ( )  over the time interval of length dt, each firm participating in the present patent race
can attain the stock value V(j) of a successful entrepreneur who becomes the technological
leader in the industry j with probability h(j)dt. Maximization of
V j L j j dt wL j dth h( ) ( ) / ( ) ( )µ −  with respect to labor input would imply an infinite R&D
investment if w)j()j(V µ> , and no R&D activity at all if V j j w( ) ( )< µ . With free entry into
the patent races the former case cannot occur. The latter case, which will be neglected in the
following, implies for such industries a stationary equilibrium without any further evolution.
The unique equilibrium with positive but finite R&D activities requires V j j w( ) ( )= µ . It is
convenient to choose labor as numéraire, i.e. w=1, so that the stock values of the incumbent
firms are determined by
(8) V j j( ) ( )= µ
in each industry. Thus, in contrast to the standard model, the shareholder values of all
incumbent firms depend on the technological conditions and will usually differ between
industries.
Each firm participating in a R&D race has no internal funds to finance its R&D activities and,
therefore, needs to borrow or to issue equity claims. As in the standard model, we assume that
innovative firms finance their R&D investments by issuing equity claims on a perfect
financial market.3 These claims pay nothing if the firm’s R&D effort fails but yield the profit
stream (6), being paid out continuously as dividends, if the firm succeeds in winning the
patent race and takes over the industry leadership, until it will itself be replaced by the next
entrepreneur in that industry. According to (8), the value of an incumbent firm remains
constant as long as the R&D efforts targeted at its industry fail. This event occurs with
probability ( ( ) )1− h j dt  in the time interval dt. With probability dt)j(h , however, one of the
targeted innovation efforts will succeed, the leader will be replaced by an entrepreneur, and
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  By extending the basic quality ladder model, Jones (1995) and Stokey (1995) use more general forms of the
innovation production function which allow for non-constant returns to scale in R&D. In such specifications,
the scale elasticity can be used as an indicator for technological opportunity.
3
 This means that all moral hazard and adverse selection problems which certainly exist when young firms
attempt to raise capital funds for risky R&D investments, are completely neglected.
8the equity owners will suffer a total capital loss of V(j). Taking the limit as time length dt
goes to zero, the no-arbitrage condition in each industry j can be written as
 (9) pi( ) ( )V( ) ( )j h j j rV j− = .
Arbitrage in the financial market ensures that the expected rate of return r(j) to the equity
owners of an incumbent firm in industry j equals the instantaneous interest rate r on a riskless
bond which will turn out to be constant over time. Since research outcomes in the different
industries are by assumption uncorrelated, the risks in all industries are idiosyncratic.
Therefore, shareholders can earn a riskless return by holding a well-diversified portfolio of
shares of firms in the continuum of industries, whereby the portfolio rate of return equals the
expected industry specific rates of return.
Substituting (6) and (8) into the no-arbitrage equation (9) yields
(10) ( / ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1− − =λ µ µj s j E j h j r j .
To close the model, we finally use the labor market clearing condition





where the first integral on the right hand side reflects aggregated employment in the
manufacturing sector, as can be seen from (4), and the second integral reflects aggregated
employment in the R&D sector, as can be seen from (7). According to (11), the only
stationary allocation of labor resources implies 

E = 0  and thus from (5)
 (12) r=ρ ,
i.e. the interest rate equals the rate of time preference and, hence, is constant over time.
5. Determinants of R&D Activities at the Industry Level and Aggregated Growth
Substituting (12) into (10), integrating the resulting expression over the continuum of
industries j, yields, using (11), the industry specific innovation rates
9(13) h j j s j L j dj j*( ) ( / ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ) / ( )= − + −1 1
0
1λ ρ µ µ ρ .
In the special symmetric case with λ(j)=λ, µ(j)=µ and s(j)=1 this solution equation
degenerates to the corresponding equation for the standard quality ladder model of
Grossman/Helpman (1991a, p. 96):
h L* ( / ) ( / ) /= − −1 1 λ µ ρ λ .
It is apparent from this symmetric solution that each industry as well as the whole economy
innovate faster the larger is the endowment of the economy with qualified labor, L, the higher
is the productivity of labor in R&D, µ-1, the larger is the expected market power, λ, and the
lower is the rate of time preference, ρ. So far, these results are certainly in concordance with
the empirical facts and provide some essential determinants of innovation and growth in
aggregated economy. However, the significant role of heterogeneity between existing
industries is completely neglected. There is a bulk of empirical evidence in Industrial
Organization literature that demand pull as well as technology push effects have large impacts
on the innovative behavior of firms (see, e.g. Kamien/Schwartz 1982, Cohen/Levin 1989,
Cohen 1995).
In our generalized model, we are now able to identify such industry specific effects.
According to (13), large (expected) market power λ(j), favorable technological opportunities
µ(j)-1, and high demand expectations s(j) unambiguously spur innovative activities in these
industries. The first effect is one of the most fundamental hypotheses originally suggested by
Schumpeter (1942). According to this hypothesis, firms require the expectation of some form
of transient market power to have an incentive to invest in R&D. Correspondingly, the model
implies that no innovation takes place when market power is small, but that there is a positive
relationship when market power is large enough.4 The second effect reflects the technology
push hypothesis and states that the less difficult and expensive an innovation project is
expected to be, the more R&D resources are invested into these projects. Among others,
Geroski (1990) found a highly significant positive impact of industry specific technological
opportunity on innovative activities of firms. The third effect is known as demand pull
hypothesis and is one of the most reliable empirical regularities in this research area (see, e.g.
Flaig/Stadler 1994). The positive effect of the economy-wide resource base, L, which is best
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 It is not easy to find an adequate empirical measure for expected market power. Many studies use for
example the Herfindahl concentration index which measures, however, ex ante market power, but not the
expectation of ex post market power. Moreover, the empirical results are far from clear. Most studies find a
positive or an inverted-U shaped relationship between market concentration and R&D activities, but
concentration contributes only little to the explanation of the variance of R&D.
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interpreted as qualified labor or human capital, clearly remains. However, the impact of the
rate of time preference, ρ, on the innovation rate of a market is now ambiguous. A rise in the
discount rate increases current expenditures, E. If some industries are characterized by a large
demand share and favorable technological opportunities, innovative activity may therefore
rise in these markets.
Using (7) and recalling that we have normalized the wage rate to one, (13) can easily be
transformed into an explicit solution equation for industry specific R&D expenditures as
L j j s j L j dj jh* ( ) ( / ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( )= − + −1 1 0
1λ ρ µ ρµ
which depend in the same way on the exogenous factors as discussed with the innovation
rates. In contrast to the standard quality ladder model, our generalized model can obviously
explain the empirical evidence that R&D expenditures differ significantly across industries.
The factors determining the distribution of R&D are attributed to industry specific market
power, technology opportunity and asymmetric demand conditions.
Finally, even in this generalized quality ladder model, an explicit aggregation over industries
can be performed. The macroeconomic utility growth rate is given by
(14)





The economy is characterized by perpetual endogenous growth. The equilibrium growth path
is characterized by a stationary allocation of labor between the manufacturing sector and the
R&D sector as well as constant consumer expenditures. The consumer expenditures are given
by the sum of labor income, L (since w is normalized to one), and profit





. Utility growth arises because of a continued quality upgrading
in industry specific patent races in an ongoing process of creative destruction.
If one is interested in an explicit analysis of the determinants of macroeconomic growth, one
has to impose some restrictions on the industry parameters. This is the reason why the
standard model exclusively deals with symmetric industries. Imposing symmetry restrictions
on the growth equation (14) yields

/ *lnC C h= λ ,
which is the well-known growth rate in the standard quality ladder model.
11
6. Conclusion
One of the most intriguing elements of Schumpeterian growth models is that they rely on non-
competitive market structures which are, according to Schumpeter, necessary for firms to
invest in risky R&D projects. The standard quality ladder model uses the patent race approach
which is well established in Industrial Organization theory, to describe the stochastic dynamic
process of vertical product innovations. Due to the inter-industry symmetry restrictions,
however, the standard model is only suitable for analyzing macroeconomic growth, but not
for accounting for industry specific effects on the supply and demand side. This paper has
shown that the standard model can consistently be extended by allowing for inter-industry
differences to derive some testable hypotheses about the determinants of R&D activities at the
industry level.
In its fundamental formulation, the standard quality ladder model is designed to explain
vertical product innovations and quality growth. But as is well-known, it can easily be
transformed into a corresponding version with cost reducing process innovations (see, e.g.
Taylor 1993). A continuing way to generate quantity growth instead of quality growth, which
was introduced by Grossman/Helpman (1991b) and Helpman (1992) and is common today, is
to reinterpret the continuum of consumer goods as a continuum of intermediate goods which
are essential inputs into the final consumer goods production. In these formulations, the
macroeconomic development is directly comparable to the alternative endogenous growth
models. However, the industry specific effects derived in this paper continue to hold even
under such modified conditions.
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